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Note
Judge, Jury and Executioner: INS Summary-Exclusion
Power Under the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
Dulce Foster*
Times are hard for people immigrating to the United States
today. Borders that were once easy to cross are now patrolled
by growing numbers of armed guards,1 and legal permission to
enter and remain here is much more difficult to obtain than it
once was.2 Aliens who finally do make it across the border, le-
gally or illegally, are greeted by a nation that is hostile to them
and unwilling to protect their interests. In 1996 Congress of-
ficially took in the welcome mat for all noncitizens when it
passed two revolutionary immigration reform laws. The Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)
was Congress's political response to the Oklahoma City bombing.3
Congress constructed and passed it hastily so that President
Clinton could sign the bill into law on the anniversary of that
* J.D. Candidate 1998, University of Minnesota Law School; BA. 1990,
Macalester College.
t See Maria Puente, Clinton Builds Up Border Patrol, DETRoIT NEws,
Feb. 21, 1997, at A7 (stating that the number of Border Patrol agents in the
United States has increased by 75% since 1993).
2. See David Johnston, Government Is Quickly Using Power of New Im-
migration Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1996, at A20 (noting that lawyers have
filed class-action lawsuits on behalf of thousands of aliens claiming that the
INS unfairly denied them eligibility for legal residence).
3. See Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). Among the AEDPA's
most controversial terms are those prescribing a secretive court for aliens
suspected of terrorist activity. See id. § 401. Another controversial provision
requires the INS to deport legal permanent residents based on minor and very
old criminal convictions withoutjudicial review. See id. §§ 435, 440. Crimes
serving as grounds for deportation in some states have included possession of
marijuana, defacing a passport, and turnstile jumping-no matter how many
years prior to deportation the conviction occurred. See Lena Williams, A Law
Aimed at Terrorists Hits Legal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMEs, July 17, 1996, at B5.
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disaster.4 Just six months later, Congress revised many of the
AEDPA's ill-considered immigration provisions when it passed
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996 (IIRIRA).' The TIRIRA is a more comprehensive
immigration reform, and the new restrictions it implements
are likely to remain law for many years.
6
Few would argue that the government's focus on immigration
policy is misplaced. Congress has a legitimate interest in regu-
lating U.S. borders and protecting its citizens from threats to
national security. Many of the IRIRA's new provisions are so
draconian, however, that they appear to be less the product of
legitimate policymaking than of national scapegoating. One
such provision gives INS agents the power to deport some
classes of suspected aliens without a trial or even an adminis-
trative hearing to determine whether they are, in fact, deport-
able under the law.' Instead, the INS simply removes a sus-
pect from the country after a brief screening interview with no
opportunity for appeal. 8 The new provision applies to all sus-
pected aliens who seek entry at the border without valid immi-
gration documents, and to any suspected alien without such
documents who has been living in the United States for two
years or less.9 Because the new procedure contains inadequate
mechanisms for detecting INS biases and mistakes, the INS
potentially could apply it against any individual who looks
"suspicious," including undocumented aliens, legal permanent
residents, refugees, asylees, and even citizens. This "summary-
exclusion" or "expedited removal" process is not only harsh, it
4. See 142 CONG. REC. S11,901 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of
Sen. Leahy). According to Carol Wolchok, staff liaison for the American Bar
Association Coordinating Committee on Immigration Law, the new immigra-
tion provisions were made with no legislative debate: "Only a handfuil of people
knew these provisions were slipped in there, and were changing law thats been
around for decades." Richard C. Reuben, McDeportation: The New Anti-
terrorism Law Allows Border Guards to Summarily Exclude Aliens Without
Documents, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1996, at 34,34.
5. See Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 546-724(1996).
6. Among its many prescriptions, this new law increases border patrol
and enforcement, see IIRIRA §§ 101-125, strengthens criminal penalties for
alien smuggling and document fraud, see id. §§ 201-215, reenacts and en-
hances AEDPA provisions relating to immigrants convicted of crimes, see id.
§§ 321-334, and makes illegal aliens ineligible for most forms of public assis-
tance, see id. §§ 500-591.
7. See id. § 302(a).
8. See id.
9. See infra notes 95-100 and accompanying text (describing the sum-
mary-exclusion provisions of the IIRmA).
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is also constitutionally suspect. By applying summary exclusion
to aliens both inside and outside the United States borders, the
IIRIRA eliminates bright-line, decades-old distinctions drawn
in American immigration law between these two groups.10 The
IIRIRA's new provisions dramatically restructure the process
through which the government expels or admits aliens.11 In
doing so, this law eviscerates procedural rights formerly guaran-
teed to specific classes of aliens and undermines the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution. 2 While many American citizens sup-
port these reforms,13 critics contend that 1996 was a pivotal
year in which intolerance and isolationist fear rose to the fore
and prompted Congress to enact legislation that turns a cen-
tury of immigration jurisprudence on its head. 14
This Note argues that the summary-exclusion provisions of
the IIRIRA violate the procedural due process guarantees of
the Constitution. Part One describes the political climate that
gave rise to the AEDPA and the IIRIRA, illuminating the policy
arguments behind immigration reform. Part One also provides a
brief overview of the Supreme Court's procedural due process
jurisprudence, outlines the historical progression of the Court's
due process analysis in the context of immigration, and ex-
plains how the IIRIRA radically revises established law. Part
Two questions the constitutional validity of the summary-
exclusion provisions of the IIRIRA that deprive specific indi-
viduals of the right to a hearing in direct conflict with immi-
gration law precedents. Part Three argues that the Supreme
Court itself has defined the class of immigrants entitled to pro-
10. See infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text (introducing the "entry
doctrine" distinction between deportable and excludable aliens).
11. See infra Part I.D (explaining how the IIRIRA reforms pre-existing
law).
12. See infra Part Il (arguing that the IIRIRA violates procedural due
process).
13. See Amy Silverman, Closed Door Policy: A Chilean National's Strug-
gle Against Deportation Raises Fundamental Questions About the Constitu-
tional Rights oflmmigrants, PHOENIX NEW TIMES, Jan. 9, 1997, at 4 (quoting
proponents of the JIRIRA who argue that it does not limit aliens' constitu-
tional rights, but simply streamlines existing law).
14. See Reuben, supra note 4, at 34 (quoting Jean Butterfield of the
American Immigration Lawyer's Association, who commented that the
AEDPA would literally "take us back decades"); see also Letter from Ana Wil-
Eams Shavers, Professor, University of Nebraska College of Law, et al. to the
Conference Committee on H.R. 2202 (July 29, 1996), reprinted in 142 CONG.
REC. S11,906 (daily ed., Sept. 30, 1996) (arguing on behalf of 90 law professors
that the IIRRA's summary-exclusion provisions threatened "the most basic
safeguards of due process").
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cedural due process protection too narrowly. This Note con-
cludes that the Court must harmonize its procedural due process
analysis in the immigration context with its jurisprudence in
other contexts by attaching due process protection to the physi-
cal liberty interest that the federal government threatens when
it deports or excludes an alien from the country.
I. THE LAW AND POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION
People choose to leave their home countries for a variety of
reasons. Some seek jobs, education, or higher standards of
living, while others seek to rejoin their families or to escape
persecution or war.15 Whatever the reasons aliens have for mi-
grating to the United States, many U.S. citizens fear that too
many aliens are entering the country.1 6 The INS legally admit-
ted 974,000 aliens in 1992." The number of illegal entrants is
more difficult to determine, but statisticians estimate that in
1992 approximately 200,000 to 300,000 undocumented aliens
entered the country.18 The INS, however, also removes more
than one million aliens from the United States each year. In
1992 the INS deported approximately 37,800 aliens and re-
quired more than 1,104,500 to depart under its supervision, 19 a
process known as "voluntary departure."20
15. See Somini Sengupta, The Changing Face of Long Island, NEWSDAY,
Nov. 5, 1995, at A4 (enumerating the reasons several Long Island immigrants
came to the United States).
16. See Richard Rayner, What Immigration Crisis?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7,
1996, § 6 (Magazine), at 26 (describing public fears and arguing that there is
no real immigration crisis in the United States).
17. See U.S. INS, 1992 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND
NATURALIZATION SERVICE 3 (1992) [hereinafter INS YEARBOOK].
18. See MICHAEL Fix & JEFFREY S. PASSEL, THE URBAN INSTITUTE,
IMIGRATION AND IMMIGRANTS: SETrING THE RECORD STRAIGHT 22 (1994).
The INS does not maintain statistics on the number of foreign-born persons
who emigrate from the United States; therefore, accurate data on the per-
centage of aliens who actually remain here is unavailable. See INS YEAR-
BOOK, supra note 17, at 179.
19. See INS YEARBOOK, supra note 17, at 156. Of the 37,800 aliens whom
the INS deported in 1992, approximately 31,800 (84%) illegally entered with-
out inspection. See id. at 166. The group of aliens who are deportable be-
cause they entered without inspection is the largest group deported each year
and is also one of the groups that the IIRIRA directly targets for summary
exclusion.
20. For a definition of voluntary departure as set forth in the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 (INA), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1533 (1994), see infra note 92.
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A. THE POLITICS BEHIND IMMIGRATION REFORM
Immigration reform is one of the most politically volatile
issues facing Congress today.21 The American public manifests
an escalating fear that the nation is undergoing a mass invasion
of legal and illegal aliens.' Several commentators have docu-
mented a disturbing increase in brutal hate crimes against aliens. 3
and many white supremacist and paramilitary groups actively
target aliens.24 Even more disturbing are human rights group
reports that border patrol agents and INS officials have vio-
lently assaulted aliens. 25 Commentators blame both the media
and political rhetoric for inciting the public's fear of aliens.26 In
21. Recently, retiring Congressman Anthony Beilenson asserted that "the
three most fundamental issues facing the nation [are] balancing the budget,
reforming the campaign finance system and lowering levels of immigration."
Anthony C. Beilenson, Perspective on Government: Time is Right to Solve Key
Issues: Washington Has a Prime Opportunity to Balance the Budget, Reform
Campaign Financing and Curb Immigration, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1997, at 17.
22. A classified ad placed by the California Coalition for Immigration Re-
form provides a strong example of America's animus towards aliens. The ad
reads, "WANTED: TESTIMONY FROM U.S. citizens who have been victims
of crimes either financial (welfare, unemployment, food stamps, etc.) educa-
tional (overcrowding, forced bilingual classes, etc.) or physical (rape, robbery,
assault, infectious disease, etc.) committed by illegal aliens. Legal advice wel-
come-possible lawsuit pending." NATVL REV., July 5, 1993, at 60, quoted in
Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of Immi-
gration, Status, Ethnicity, Gender, and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1509, 1533
n.90 (1995).
23. See, e.g., Marco E. Lopez, Illegal Aliens: Defusing the Polemics, 2 SAN
DIEGO JUST. J. 75, 76-79 (1994) (detailing several violent attacks against legal
and illegal Mexican aliens in Southern California, including one incident in
which American citizens deliberately shot a Mexican child in the head as he
crossed the border with his family).
24. See Michael J. Nunez, Violence at Our Border: Rights and Status of
Immigrant Victims of Hate Crimes and Violence Along the Border Between the
United States and Mexico, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1573, 1576 (1992) (noting the ac-
tivities of two such groups, the Civilian Material Assistance, a civilian para-
military group patrolling the border, and the Ku Klux Klan).
25. INS officials claim that complaints of abuse are actually decreasing
and that incidents of violence are isolated. See Nancy Nusser, Beating of
Mexicans by California Police Renews Debate Over Rights: Anti-immigrant
Feeling Cited amid Cry of Abuse, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Apr. 14, 1996, at 13A
(explaining that such abuse is not a common occurrence). Human rights
groups paint a different picture. Mexico's human rights commission states
that during a three month period in 1994 along the California border Mexican
aliens reported 67 cases of beatings and two cases of rape by INS and Border
Patrol agents. See id. (disagreeing with assertions of INS officials).
26. See Kevin R. Johnson, Los Olividados: Images of the Immigrant, Po-
litical Power of Noncitizens, and Immigration Law and Enforcement, 1993
BYU. L. REV. 1139, 1169-70, 1172-73 (suggesting that political speeches on
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turn, public attitude has encouraged politicians' efforts to re-
strict immigration.27
Some of the most common complaints allege that aliens im-
port crime and drugs,28 displace American workers,29 and unjusti-
fiably burden public benefits programs. 30 Immigrant-rights advo-
cates question the empirical validity of these concerns on a
number of grounds. Some argue that the per-capita percentage of
aliens in prison is no higher than that of citizens. 31 Others con-
tend that anti-immigrant commentators have vastly overstated
the impact of immigration on job displacement.3 2 Finally, immi-
crimes committed by legal and illegal aliens and news stories associating the World
Trade Center bombing with abuse of asylum laws are factors contributing towards
anti-immigrant public attitudes).
27. For an argument that anti-immigrant public attitudes have also influ-
enced the judiciary, see id. at 1771 n.117.
28. Representative Lamar Smith, a key supporter of the IUIRA, cited
drug enforcement as a primary reason for his support, arguing "if we cannot
control who enters our country, such as illegal aliens, we cannot control what
enters our country, such as illegal drugs." Statement of Rep. Lamar Smith
(R-Tx) on the Conference Report OT, H.R. 2202, The Illegal Immigration Re-
form and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Fed. Document Clearing House, Sep-
tember 24, 1996, available in LEXIS, New.curnws file.
29. See William R. Tamayo, When the "Coloreds" Are Neither Black nor
Citizens: The United States Civil Rights Movement and Global Migration, 2
ASIAN L. J. 1, 11 (1995) (arguing that African-American anti-immigrant atti-
tudes result from the perception that aliens are squeezing African-Americans
out of the job market). Others criticize the URIRA for its failure to enact
stronger penalties for employers who hire illegal aliens. See 143 CONG. REc.
S704-05 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1997) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (proposing an
amendment to the I[RIRA which would create stronger penalties for employ-
ers who hire illegal aliens).
30. Public benefits were a key point of contention between the House and
Senate during debates on the IRIRA. See Immigration Politics, ST. PE-
TERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 25, 1996, at 10A (noting that, because of a House
amendment that would have denied aliens access to public education, the
IIRIRA faced a filibuster in the Senate and a veto by President Clinton).
31. See David E. Hayes-Bautista & Gregory Rodriguez, The Criminaliza-
tion of the Latino Identity Makes ighting Gangs That Much Harder, L-.A
TIMES, Sept. 15, 1996, at M1 (citing Anne Piehl, Professor at the Harvard
University Kennedy School of Government, who found that Latino aliens have
lower incarceration rates than do U.S.-born individuals); see also Ardy Fried-
berg & Mary C. Williams, Newcomers Pay for Crimes of Others, SUN-
SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Oct. 30, 1994, at 8S (citing statistics showing that
aliens were arrested at a rate lower than their representative proportion in
Florida's population).
32. The General Accounting Office (GAO) reports that recent national
studies generally conclude that job displacement associated with illegal immi-
gration is either minimal or non-existent. See U.S. GAO, GAO/HEHS 95-133,
ILLEGAL ALIENS-NATIONAL NET COST ESTIMATES VARY WIDELY 17 (1995)
[hereinafter GAO REPORT].
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grant-rights advocates argue that most of the aliens using public
benefits are either elderly, capable of naturalizing and receiving
benefits as citizens, or refugees fleeing persecution who are under-
standably in need of temporary assistance.33
The cost of immigration is a primary concern for propo-
nents of immigration restrictions, especially in states where
large numbers of aliens settle.34 These states foot the bill for
many of the public services that benefit aliens, including edu-
cation, medical care, housing assistance, infrastructure im-
provements, and prison costs.3 5 Yet aliens also generate state
and federal revenue, including income, sales, property, Social
Security, and gasoline taxes.36 Some analysts have concluded
that aliens generate more revenue at local, state, and national
levels combined than the total cost of services they receive.
They argue that when all costs and benefits are considered to-
gether, the federal government receives an excessive portion of
the surplus. 38 As a result, aliens generate a net gain for the
federal government and a net loss for many states and locali-
ties.3 9 This discrepancy may contribute significantly to the
anti-immigrant atmosphere in border states such as California.
The administration of immigration hearings is another sig-
nificant public cost, although politicians and reform advocates do
not cite it often as a major concern behind immigration reform.
Language in the ITRIRA suggests that the new summary-
33. See Fix & PASSEL, supra note 18, at 63-67 (indicating that the 1994
welfare reform proposal would likely generate little net welfare savings from
changes to immigrant eligibility because refugees and the elderly would still
be eligible and the those capable of naturalizing constitute a large percentage
of aliens losing eligibility).
34. Forty percent of all illegal aliens live in California. See Note, Unen-
forced Boundaries: Illegal Immigration and the Limits of Judicial Federalism,
108 HARV. L. REV. 1643, 1645 (1995).
35. See id.
36. See GAO REPORT, supra note 32, at 17 (listing the types of revenues
illegal aliens generate).
37. See Fix & PASSEL, supra note 18, at 57.
38. See id. at 57-58.
39. See id.; see also Note, supra note 34, at 1643 (noting the inequity of
the distribution between the states and the federal government of the costs
and benefits of illegal immigration).
40. Congress appropriated $109,519,000 to the Executive Office for Immi-
gration Review for fiscal year 1997. See 142 CONG. REC. H11,843 (daily ed.
Sept. 28,1996) (Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference)
(detailing the appropriations agreed on in Conference Committee for the 1997
budget). Over six million dollars of that amount will facilitate hiring 24 addi-
tionalimmigrationjudges. See id.
1997] 215
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exclusion provisions directly target this expense by attempting
to reduce the time necessary to process aliens' cases.
41
Whether the new procedures will result in direct, significant
cost savings by reducing the cost of hearings and immigration-
related detention is a question open for empirical study.42
B. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit state and
federal governments from depriving any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law." 3 The Supreme Court
has interpreted these clauses to guarantee individuals the
right to fair procedures to determine the legality of government
action depriving them of an important interest.' To bring a
successful procedural due process challenge, a claimant must
demonstrate that the Constitution protects a legally or consti-
tutionally cognizable interest that is at issue.45 An interest is
cognizable only if it falls within very narrow court-made definitions
of life, liberty, or property.46 When a claimant successfully demon-
41. The IIRIRA commands the Comptroller General to complete a study
on the operation and costs of expedited alien removal procedures. See
IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, § 302(b), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 584 (1996).
42. See id. at § 302(b)(1)(B) (indicating that one aspect of the study is to
determine the resources saved by the new expedited removal procedures).
43. U.S. CONST., amends. V, XIV. Importantly, this text is inclusiva of
any person with a life, liberty, or property interest. It does not refer only to
citizens, as do other provisions in the Constitution, including the Privileges
and Immunities Clause, see U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, and those relating to
the qualifications for legislators and president, see U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2, cl.
2; art. I, § 3, c. 3; art. H, § 1, c. 5.
44. See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125-26 (1990) (explaining
the procedural component of the Due Process Clause).
45. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972) (noting
that before due process requirements apply, the interest must be within the
Constitution's protection).
46. See id. at 569-70 (stating that the range of interests protected by the
procedural component of the Due Process Clause is not "infinite"). The Due
Process Clause most clearly guarantees fair procedure when the government
physically restrains an individual and deprives her of an important liberty
interest. The Court has held that "[fireedom from bodily restraint has always
been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbi-
trary governmental action." Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992).
While the definitions of life and liberty arise from the Constitution itself,
the Court has held that "[p]roperty interests ... are not created by the Consti-
tution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law." Roth, 408 U.S. at 577. An individual's "unilateral expectation" of a
benefit creates no recognized property interest in it without some "legitimate
claim of entitlement to it" under law. Id. Some courts have attempted to
216 [Vol. 82:209
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strates that the Due Process Clause protects a given interest,
the court determines which precise procedural guarantees ap-
ply by balancing the government's interest in reducing admin-
istrative burdens against the private interest involved and the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest.4 7
The Supreme Court recognizes that aliens in some cir-
cumstances have a right to procedural due process and has
applied this standard test in the immigration context to de-
termine what process is due.48 Before applying this balancing
test, however, a court must initially find that there are factual
issues in dispute.4 9 Although it does not compel a judicial trial
in all cases, due process at a minimum requires the govern-
ment to give a claimant the opportunity to be heard "at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."" An essential
element of due process in all circumstances is that a fair and
impartial decisionmaker adjudge the parties' claims.51
limit the scope of cognizable property interests by suggesting that a person
must already receive a benefit or have a recognized claim to it before a prop-
erty interest in it will arise. See, e.g., Gregory v. Town of Pittsfield, 479 A.2d
1304, 1307-08 (Me. 1984) (finding an individual must already be qualified and
eligible to receive a benefit from the government before gaining a property in-
terest in it). This "present enjoyment" requirement is not a clearly estab-
lished doctrine. See Gregory v. Town of Pittsfield, 470 U.S. 1018, 1021 (1985)(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that the state court's conclusion that a
claimant had no cognizable property interest in public benefits she had not yet
received was "unsettling" and contrary to "the weight of authority among
lower courts"), denying cert. to Gregory v. Town of Pittsfield, 479 A.2d 1304
(Me. 1984).
47. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (identifying the
factors involved in the balancing test).
48. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34-37 (1982) (applying the
Mathews balancing test to determine whether the exclusion hearing given to a
returning legal permanent resident met procedural due process require-
ments).
49. The Court has held that the Due Process Clause requires no formal
procedure when there are no factual issues to resolve. See, e.g., Codd v. Vel-
ger, 429 U.S. 624, 626-27 (1977) (per curiam).
50. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545,
552 (1965)).
51. The Supreme Court has held that "Enlot only is a biased decision-
maker constitutionally unacceptable, but 'our system of law has always en-
deavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.'" Withrow v. Larkin,
421 U.S. 35,47 (1975) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
1997] 217
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C. THE DEVELOPMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAW'S ENTRY
DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court has held that no alien has a substan-
tive constitutional right to enter or remain in the United
States. 2 Some aliens, however, have constitutionally protected
procedural rights in connection with the immigration process.
The Supreme Court's holdings over the last century have re-
sulted in a sharp division between the procedural rights of ali-
ens inside and aliens outside U.S. borders. Those inside the
country are entitled to procedural due process in immigration
proceedings, while those outside the country are not.53 Com-
mentators have criticized this doctrine, known as the "entry
doctrine," because it creates a confusing anomaly-aliens who
break the law to enter the country have due process rights,
while those who comply with federal law and present them-
selves at the border for inspection do not.' Nonetheless, the
Court has upheld the distinction consistently on the ground
that an alien who gains admission develops stronger ties with
the United States as a result of establishing a residence.55 In
compliance with the entry doctrine, the government provides
more extensive administrative procedures when it "deports"
52. See Landon, 459 U.S. at 32 (stating that "the power to admit or ex-
clude aliens is a sovereign prerogative").
53. "It is true that aliens who have once passed through our gates, even
illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional
standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law. But an alien on the
threshold of initial entry stands on a different footing...." Shaughnessy v.
United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (internal citations omit-
ted).
54. See, e.g., T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal Regulation of Aliens and the
Constitution, 83 AM. J. INVL L. 862, 867 (1989) (arguing that the distinction
cannot withstand analysis because aliens inside and outside the border may
both have family or job-related ties to the United States and, therefore, have
similar interests at stake); Tamara J. Conrad, Comment, The Constitutional
Rights of Excludable Aliens: History Provides a Refuge, 61 WASH. L. REv.
1449, 1478 (1986) (concluding that the aliens outside the United States should
be afforded due process rights similar to those of aliens physically present).
55. See Landon, 459 U.S. at 32. Commentators assert that another pos-
sible rationale for the entry doctrine is that the Constitution has no territorial
force beyond U.S. borders and, therefore, cannot protect aliens who are not
physically present. Seee.g., Developments in the Law-Immigration Policy
and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1286, 1320 (1983) (noting that the
rationale of a lack of extra-territorial jurisdiction originated in the earliest
exclusion cases).
218 [Vol. 82:209
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aliens already inside the country than when it "excludes" those
outside the country. 6
1. Immigration Law Until 1950
The Supreme Court began defining whether and how the Con-
stitution restricts the government's power to exclude or deport ali-
ens in the late 1800s 7 In 1882 Congress enacted a federal statute
restricting admission of persons with Chinese ancestry.5 8 The
first immigration cases the Supreme Court heard were chal-
lenges to this legislation, laying the foundation upon which all
immigration jurisprudence rests.
The Supreme Court upheld the Chinese exclusion statute
in 1889, thereby establishing the federal government's power
to place substantive restrictions on the admission of aliens
stopped at or outside U.S. borders.5 9 The Court found federal
authority to regulate immigration in the federal power to negoti-
ate with other countries as an independent sovereign nation.6
The executive and legislative branches traditionally have ple-
nary authority over foreign affairs. Therefore, the immigration
56. See Philip Geller, Annotation, Procedural Due Process Requirements
in Proceedings to Exclude or Deport Aliens-Supreme Court Cases, 74 L. ED.
2D 1066, 1069-70 (1996). The process of removing an incoming alien is called
"exclusion," and the term "excludable" describes an incoming alien who is
subject to removal under immigration law. The process of removing an alien
within U.S. borders is called "deportation," and the term "deportable" de-
scribes such an alien who is subject to removal under substantive immigration
law.
57. See James A. Nafziger, The General Admission of Aliens Under Inter-
national Law, 77 AM. J. INT'L L 804, 835 n.168 (1983) (explaining that active
federal involvement in immigration regulation began in 1875 with the passage
of statutes against the immigration of criminals, prostitutes, "idiots, lunatics,
and those likely to become public charges"); see also INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1182
(1994) (indicating that admission restrictions on these grounds still exist).
58. See Nafziger, supra note 57, at 835 n.168 (identifying congressional
statutory restrictions on Chinese immigration).
59. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606-07 (1889)
(establishing the federal government's power to restrict alien admission to the
United States). The Chinese Exclusion Case upheld the exclusion of a Chinese
national who had legally resided in the United States for 12 years. He left the
country legally, yet officials subsequently denied his reentry. See id. at 609.
60. See id. at 603-04 (highlighting the Court's notion that a more limited
power would be indicative of national weakness). The Court re-emphasized
the plenary character of the Legislature's power over immigration issues,
stating that " '[olver no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Con-
gress more complete than it is over' the admission of aliens." Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972) (quoting Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Strana-
ban, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909)).
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power rests virtually exclusively in the political branches6'_
almost as far beyond judicial review as a decision to go to
war.62 In 1893 the Court broadened the scope of the federal
government's power to substantively limit immigration and
held that Congress has authority to deport aliens who are al-
ready residents inside U.S. borders.63
In 1892 the Supreme Court decided Nishimura Ekiu v.
United States,6 the first significant case governing the proce-
dural rights of aliens subject to exclusion from the United
States. The Nishimura Ekiu opinion contained several highly
significant holdings. Although the Court found that an impris-
oned alien could obtain a writ of habeas corpus to ascertain the
validity of her imprisonment, it also held that the judiciary has
no power to review an administrative determination that an
alien is "excludable."65 In a related finding, the Court held that
"the decisions of executive or administrative officers, acting
within powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due process of
law."66 The Court additionally held that an excludable alien
acquired no right to land in the United States simply because
authorities detained her inside the border during immigration
proceedings. 67
61. See Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892)
(clarifying the source of the political branches' immigration power). Executive
authority to regulate immigration arises from the power to make treaties;
legislative authority arises from the power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations, to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and to declare war. See
id.
62. See The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 606-07 (analogizing the
presence of unwanted or dangerous aliens to the invasion of a foreign army
during war).
63. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893) (upholding
the deportation of a Chinese immigrant who, upon his arrest, could not pro-
duce documentation confirming his right to remain). The Fong Yue Ting court
additionally found that deportation is not a criminal punishment, but a civil
matter. See id. at 730. This finding has had an enormous impact on the pro-
cedural rights of deportable immigrants, as none of the safeguards required in
criminal trials are applicable to deportation hearings See id.
64. 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
65. See id. at 660 (holding that the judiciary is without power to review
administrative determinations that an alien is "excludable"). See also supra
note 56 (Offering definitions of the terms "excludable" and "deportable").
66. Id. (citations omitted). The Court offered this statement to justify
upholding the administrative officer's decision even though he had not taken
or recorded the alien's testimony before excluding her. See id.
67. See id. at 661.
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The Court dramatically curbed the trend towards unhm-
ited legislative and executive control over immigration law and
procedure in a landmark 1903 decision, the Japanese Immi-
grant Case. 8 In this case, the Supreme Court held that the
government could not deport an alien without affording her
procedural due process protections, including the right to a
hearing,69 even though the claimant allegedly entered the
country illegally and had only been in the United States for
four days when immigration officials stopped her." Citing and
clarifying its earlier opinion in Nishimura Ekiu, the Court held
that government officials may not ignore due process principals
when personal liberty is at stake.7 The decision guaranteed
only minimal due process protection, however, because the
Court also held that the required hearing need not be a judicial
trial 2 The Court further found that an administrative hearing
without the assistance of an interpreter was sufficient to meet due
process requirements.7 3
68. 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
69. See id. at 100-101.
70. See id. at 87.
7L See id. (clarifying the Court's position that personal liberty is pro-
tected under due process). The Court stated:
Now, it has been settled that... the order of an executive officer, in-
vested with the power to determine finally the facts upon which an
alien's right to enter this country, or remain in it, depended, was 'due
process of law .... ' But this court has never held... that adminis-
trative officers, when executing the provisions of a statute involving
the liberty of persons, may disregard the fundamental principles that
inhere in 'due process of law' ....
Id. at 100 (citations omitted).
72. See id. at 100-02 (indicating that a judicial trial is not necessary to
satisfy the due process protection afforded to immigrants).
73. See id. at 101-02. In accordance with notions of due process at the
beginning of the century, the Court upheld the procedures officials exercised
in the case at bar even though the same immigration officer both investigated
and heard the case. The alien had no assistance of counsel. See id at 88.
Moreover, because she had no access to an interpreter she claimed she did not
understand that the investigation related to deportation. See id. at 88, 100-
02. The Court noted, however, that the alien did have an unexercised right to
appeal the immigration officer's decision to the Secretary of the Treasury. See
id. at 102.
Today's notions of due process are substantially more protective. For ex-
ample, courts acknowledge that a deportable alien's right to counsel at his
own expense is a constitutional due process right. See Rios-Berrios v. INS,
776 F.2d 859, 862 (9th Cir. 1985). Moreover, courts recognize that due proc-
ess requires the presence of a competent interpreter for non-English speaking
aliens. See Gonzales v. Zurbrick, 45 F.2d 934, 937 (6th Cir. 1930). Commen-
tators argue that courts significantly expanded the due process requirements
1997]
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2. Immigration Law from 1950-1996
Both deportable and excludable aliens' procedural rights
gradually expanded following the Japanese Immigrant Case,
but, beginning with Knauff v. Shaughnessy74 in 1950, the Su-
preme Court radically reversed this trend." In Knauff the
Court relied on Nishimura Ekiu to assert that the government
had unlimited, unreviewable power to regulate procedure in
exclusion cases.7 6  Knauff upheld the exclusion of an alien
married abroad to an American soldier, stating that
"[wihatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due
process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.7 Three
years later, in a broad extension of the rule that excludable ali-
ens have no procedural due process rights, the Court found
that where the government sought to exclude an alien, but no
other country would accept him, it could imprison him at the
border indefinitely without a hearing.78 The alien's prior resi-
for civil matters in general during the 1970s, resulting in a concomitant in-
crease in the due process protections granted in immigration proceedings.
See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Pro-
cedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLuM. L. REV.
1625, 1632 (1992).
74. 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
75. See Conrad, supra note 54, at 1455 (arguing that the Court in Knauff
ignored an expansion in procedural due process rights for excludable aliens
that occurred in the early 1900s, and that the Knauff decision was partially
responsible for a major shift in the Court's jurisprudence reversing that ex-
pansion).
76. See Knauff, 338 U.S. at 543-44.
77. Id., 338 U.S. at 544. The Court in Knauff based its decision, in part,
on a declaration that admission is a privilege rather than a right. See id. at
542. A few decades ago, courts sharply categorized individual interests into
protected "rights" and unprotected gratuitous government benefits or
"privileges." See Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 57-58 (D.C. Cir. 1950),
affd per curiam, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) (holding that a public employment is not
a right, and therefore, procedural due process is inapplicable to such claims).
Modern courts have rejected the rights/privileges distinction in traditional
civil cases. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972) (explaining
that the Constitutional safeguards of life, liberty, and property no longer turn
on being classified as "rights" rather than "privileges"). The Supreme Court
has failed, however, to move immigration law forward at a pace comparable to
other areas of law. It recently reaffirmed the rights/privileges rationale set
forth in Knauff. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) (classifying
an immigrant's pursuit of admission into the United States as a privilege and
not a constitutional right).
78. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 214-16(1953). Mezei involved an alien whom government officials considered to be a
security risk. See id. at 208. Officials would not disclose the basis of the de-
cision to exclude him on the ground that the information was confidential, and
its disclosure would injure the public interest. See id. The district court re-
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dence in the United States for over twenty years had no impact
on his constitutional standing. 9 In another 1958 case, the
Court, relying on Nishimura Ekiu, held that aliens detained
pending administrative proceedings or removal are stopped
outside the border.s0 As a result of this legal construction, such
aliens are legally excludable and therefore are not entitled to due
process even though they are physically inside the border. 81
Although the Supreme Court severely restricted the proce-
dural due process rights of excludable aliens in the 1950s, it
preserved the holding in the Japanese Immigrant Case that
aliens facing deportation are entitled to a hearing.' As a re-
sult, deportable aliens have substantially greater constitu-
tional protections than aliens facing exclusion.83 Congress may
not deport aliens without a fair and impartial hearing but may
exclude aliens with no process at all. These dual holdings form
the foundation of the entry doctrine.
leased the alien on bond after he was detained at Ellis Island for almost two
years. See id. at 209. The court of appeals affirmed but the Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the court had no power to authorize his release, par-
ticularly since he presented a security risk. See id. at 216.
79. See id. at 213. The Supreme Court cited Mezei with approval as re-
cently as 1982. See Landon, 459 U.S. at 33.
80. See Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 186 (1958); see also supra
note 67 and accompanying text (reciting Nishimura Ekiu's holding that an
excludable alien's right to enter the United States remained unchanged al-
though officials detained her inside the country).
81 See Conrad, supra note 54, at 1452-53 (explaining the status of enter-
ing aliens detained inside the border).
82. See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49-50 (1950). Wong
Yang Sung held that deportable aliens must receive a hearing, although not
necessarily in a judicial court. See id. It further cautioned that administra-
tive hearings must be impartial. See id. The Court held that the practice of
permitting inspection officers to serve the dual functions of investigating
cases and presiding over deportation hearings did not comport with current
standards of impartiality as defined by the Administrative Procedure Act un-
der which the appellant brought his claim. See id. at 42. The Court later held
that the INA rather than the Administrative Procedure Act set the procedural
standards in deportation hearings. See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 306-
10 (1955). Its holding did not affect the Wong Yang Sung impartiality rule,
however, because the pre-reform INA provided that "[nlo special inquiry offi-
cer shall conduct a proceeding in any case under this section in which he shall
have participated in investigative functions or in which he shall have partici-
pated (except as provided in this subsection) in prosecuting functions." 8
U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1994).
83. See supra note 53 (quoting Mezei, 345 U.S. at 215-16).
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3. Differences in Deportation and Exclusion Proceedings
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act
Regardless of its apparent peculiarity, the entry doctrine
has persisted. As a result, statutory immigration law devel-
oped two distinct procedures for removing aliens from the
United States.' The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA),
enacted in 1952 and modified by the AEDPA and the IIRIRA,
constitutes the main corpus of United States immigration
law." Until Congress enacted the AEDPA last year, the INA
afforded all deportable aliens a recorded, impartial adminis-
trative hearing.86 The INA also granted these protections to
excludable aliens," although they are not required pursuant to
Supreme Court precedents.88 An alien in deportation proceedings,
however, could appeal any adverse administrative finding di-
rectly to a federal Court of Appeals, while an alien in exclusion
proceedings could only appeal to the judiciary through a writ of
habeas corpus. 9
The INA granted a number of privileges to aliens in deporta-
tion proceedings not accorded to aliens in exclusion proceedings.
It gave aliens in deportation the express right to counsel and
required immigration officials to provide them with lists of pro
bono attorneys; aliens in exclusion had no guaranteed right to
counsel.90 Aliens in deportation received at least fourteen days'
notice of the charges against them; aliens in exclusion were not
entitled to express notice under the statute.9' Furthermore,
84. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (defining deportation and
exclusion).
85. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101-1533 (1994).
86. See id. § 1252(b). The immigration judges who conduct immigration
hearings are not a part of the judiciary. They function instead under the At-
torney General through the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR),
an arm of the Department of Justice. See Elaine Song, Leaving the Land of
the Free, CONN. L. TRIB., July 8, 1996, available in LEXIS, News.Curnws file.
Immigration hearings are thus administrative and not judicial in nature. The
INS, also a branch of the Department of Justice, operates independently from
the EOIR. See id. This structure separates the authorities responsible for enforc-
ing and those responsible for interpreting the immigration laws, while permitting
the executive to retain primary control over both fimctions.
87. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226.
88. See supra notes 64, 77-78 and accompanying text (citing the
Nishimura Ekiu, Knauff, and Mezei holdings that due process does not re-
quire a hearing in exclusion cases).
89. See 8 U.S.C. § 1105a.
90. See id. §§ 1252b, 1226.
9L See id. The statute required deportation notices to be printed in Eng-
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deportable aliens could seek specific forms of relief unavailable
to excludable aliens, including "voluntary departure" and
"suspension of deportation."92
D. THE REFORMING PROVISIONS OF THE NEW LAW
The IIRIRA effectively obliterates the entry doctrine by
redefining the language of immigration law, obfuscating its ef-
fects on the constitutional rights of aliens. Under the new Act,
deportation and exclusion procedures are no longer different-
the IIRIRA eliminates the separate concepts of "deportation"
and "exclusion" and, in their place, adopts the term "removal
hearing" to describe the only forum in which aliens may present
their immigration claims.93 As a result, an alien's status as ei-
ther newly arriving or already present in the United States no
longer conclusively determines what kind of procedural pro-
tection she will receive. With few exceptions,
94 the TRIRA
guarantees a removal hearing only to those aliens whom the
INS has already "admitted" with valid immigration docu-
ments,95 or those who can demonstrate that they have lived in
lish and in Spanish. See id. § 1252b(a)(3)(A).
92. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e), (governing voluntary departure); § 1252(e)
(governing suspension of deportation). An alien awarded voluntary departure
is allowed to leave the country using his own resources within a given period
of time. See id. § 1254(e). The IRIRA repeals the voluntary departure pro-
visions of the INA and replaces them with new provisions. See IIRIRA §
304(a)(3). The IIRIRA permits voluntary departure either in lieu of a removal
hearing, or in lieu of removal after an adverse determination at the hearing.
See id. An alien seeking voluntary departure must be able to prove that he
has been a resident of the United States for a least one year, is of good moral
character, and has the financial means to effect his own departure. See id.
Suspension of deportation is a discretionary form of relief available to ali-
ens who have resided in the United States for a number of years, are of good
moral character, and would suffer extreme hardship from deportation. See 8
U.S.C. §1254(a). Suspension of deportation allows an alien to receive status
as a lawful permanent resident. See id. The pre-reform INA required seven
years' residence. See id. § 1252(e). The IIRIRA has a ten-year residence re-
quirement and terms the relief "cancellation of removal." IfRIRA § 304.
93. See IIRIRA § 304. This section of the Act replaces the INA's deporta-
tion provisions, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b), but omits language contained therein pro-
hibiting a hearing officer from also conducting investigative or prosecuting
fimctions in the same case. See IIRIRA § 304. The removal hearing proce-
dures of the IRIRA are thus less protective than the deportation procedures
of the INA. See supra note 82 (discussing Court precedents prohibiting immi-
gration officers from serving investigative and judicial roles in the same case,
and quoting the INA's provision prohibiting the same).
94. See infra notes 103-106 and accompanying text (enumerating classes
of aliens excepted from the summary-exclusion provisions).
95. The IIRIRA defines a legal entry into the United States with valid
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the United States for more than two years. 6 All others are
subject to summary exclusion.97  Consequently, the two pri-
mary determinants of what process the government will grant
are the legality of the alien's entry and the length of time dur-
ing which the alien has resided in the United States.
The summary-exclusion process begins with the inspection
officer's general screening of all aliens.98 The officer automati-
cally orders the summary exclusion of aliens whom the officer
believes to be arriving with fraudulent immigration documents
or no documents at all.99 Moreover, the ITIRA permits sum-
mary exclusion of all aliens who allegedly have entered illegally
and lived in the United States continuously for two years or
less."c° The statute thereby permits the INS to subject deportable
aliens to removal without a hearing even if they have lived in the
United States for many months.
Application of the summary-exclusion provisions against
this class of aliens is within the Attorney General's discretion,
and she decided not to implement them on the IRIRA's effec-
tive date of April 1, 1997.101 The Department of Justice explic-
itly reserves the right to apply summary exclusion to such aliens
immediately, however, if "operationally warranted." 2
immigration documents as an "admission." ITRIRA § 301(a). Following from
this definition, undocumented arriving aliens, aliens who entered without in-
spection (EWE), and those who entered with fraudulent documents are
deemed to be "seeking admission." See id. This language abolishes physical
presence as an important factor and focuses attention instead on whether the
alien entered legally. It is important to note that aliens who illegally overstay
a temporary visa are already "admitted." A distinction thus arises between
aliens who entered illegally and those illegally here by some other means. All
EWI aliens (with the exception of battered women and children) are presumed
"inadmissible" and are consequently subject to summary exclusion under the
terms of the statute. See id. §§ 301(c), 302(a).
96. See id. § 302(a).
97. See id. The statute refers to summary exclusion as "expedited re-
moval." Id. See supra text accompanying note 8 for a definition of summary
exclusion.
98. See lIRIRA § 302(a).
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. The Department of Justice announced this decision in a supplemen-
tary comment to the interim regulations governing application of the RIRL.
See Aliens and Nationality, 62 FED. REG. 10,311, 10,313-14 (1997). The stated
rationale for this decision is that "application of the expedited removal provi-
sions to aliens already in the United States will involve more complex deter-
minations of fact and will be more difficult to manage." Id-
102. Id. If and when the Attorney General decides to implement these
provisions she will publish a notice of her decision in the Federal Register.
See id. The Attorney General's decision is not subject to judicial review. See
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The statute creates a few important exceptions to the
standard summary-exclusion rules. If during the screening
process an alien indicates either an intent to apply for asylum
or a well-founded fear of persecution, the officer must refer that
individual to an asylum officer for further review. 103 Summary
exclusion also does not apply to aliens who arrived by aircraft
and are citizens of countries in the Western Hemisphere with
whom the United States does not have full diplomatic rela-
tions.1 Moreover, battered women and children are not sub-
ject to summary exclusion if they can demonstrate that their
illegal entry into the United States is related to their experi-
ences with domestic abuse.10 5 Finally, if an alien claims under
oath and penalty of perjury to be a legal permanent resident,
refugee, or asylee, the screening officer's removal order is sub-
ject to administrative appeal.10 6 Aside from these exceptions, a
screening officer's decision to summarily exclude an alien is not
reviewable by any administrative or judicial tribunal. 0 7
]IRRA § 302(a).
103. See IIRIRA § 302(a).
104. See id. This exception excludes Cuban refugees from summary-
exclusion provisions. See Aliens and Nationality, 62 FED. REG. at 10,355.
During congressional debates on the Act, Senator Leahy surmised that 'this
exception shows that the majority does not trust the procedures that they are
imposing on refugees from all other countries in the world." 142 CONG. REC.
S11,902 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996).
105. An alien who illegally entered the country may rebut the presumption
that she is inadmissible by demonstrating that she is a battered woman, an
abused child, or the non-abusive parent of an abused child and that there is a
substantial connection between the alien's unlawful entry and the abuse. See
IIRIRA § 301(c). The statute offers additional protections for battered women
and children whose abusers are citizens or legal permanent residents of the
United States. See id. § 304(a)(3). An illegal alien who has suffered such abuse
and who has lived in the United States for at least three years may apply for can-
cellation of removal and adjustment to the status of legal permanent resident. See
id. In addition, the law permits abused women and children to self-petition for
immediate relative status (legal admission based on close familial relationship
to a citizen or legal permanent resident) without the cooperation of the abu-
sive spouse or parent. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b)(2), 1154(a)(1) (1994).
106. See IIRIRA § 302(a).
107. See id The URIRA expressly limits habeas corpus review to claims
asserting that a suspect is not an alien, was not ordered removed under the
summary-exclusion provisions of the Act, or is a legal permanent resident,
refugee, or asylee. See id. § 306(a)(2). A suspected alien may not argue in ha-
beas corpus proceedings that he is actually admissible or that he is entitled to
relief from removal See id.
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H. THE IIRIRA VIOLATES AN ALIEN'S RIGHT TO
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
The IIRIRA violates the procedural component of the Due
Process Clause in a number of ways. It directly conflicts with
Supreme Court immigration decisions that have stood for close
to a century.0 8 Furthermore, the IIRIRA fails the Court's
standard procedural due process balancing test."°9 Lastly, the
new immigration law cannot withstand judicial scrutiny be-
cause it does not rest on a rational, coherent legal theory.
A. THE IIRIRA CONFLICTS WITH SUPREME COURT
IMMIGRATION LAW PRECEDENT
The Supreme Court cannot uphold the IIRIRA against a
procedural due process challenge without overruling the Japa-
nese Immigrant Case. Although the Japanese Immigrant Case
held that the Due Process Clause guarantees all deportable
aliens the right to a hearing,110 the IIRIRA permits removal of
some deportable aliens without hearing or review."'
The Japanese Immigrant Case guaranteed very little in its
holding that deportable aliens must receive a hearing. It up-
held the constitutional adequacy of the hearing even though
the same inspector had investigated and adjudged the claim
and even though the alien had no access to counsel or an inter-
preter.1 2 The government could argue that the screening in-
terview afforded an alien under the IIRIRA is no less cursory
108. As recently as 1993, the Supreme Court cited with approval the 1903
Japanese Immigrant Case holding that aliens in deportation are entitled to
procedural due process. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993).
109. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (reciting the Court's balancing
test as articulated in Mathews).
110. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (recounting the Japanese
Immigrant Case holding that an alien in deportation has the right to a hearing).
111. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text (enumerating the terms
of the IRIRA's summary-exclusion provisions). Summary exclusion is appli-
cable to some EWI aliens at the unreviewable discretion of the Attorney Gen-
eral. See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text (explaining the Attorney
General's discretionary role in applying summary exclusion to illegal entrants
living in the United States for two years or less). This analysis assumes for the
purpose of argument that the Attorney General will sometime exercise her
discretion to apply summary exclusion to EWI aliens who have lived in the
United States for less than two years.
112. See supra notes 72-73 (describing the procedure upheld in the Japa-
nese Immigrant Case).
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than that upheld in the Japanese Immigrant Case.113 This as-
sertion is unsound, however, because in the Japanese Immi-
grant Case the Court based its decision in part on the claim-
ant's failure to exercise her right to appeal to a higher
administrative authority."' The IIRIRA's summary-exclusion
process strictly prohibits either judicial or administrative ap-
peal. 115 Consequently, failures on the part of an inspecting of-
ficer to investigate an alien's claim adequately will stand al-
most totally unchecked.11 6 The lack of opportunity to appeal
significantly differentiates the process deemed mandatory in
the Japanese Immigrant Case from that afforded an alien un-
der the summary-exclusion provisions of the IIRIRA. There-
fore, summary exclusion does not satisfy the procedural re-
quirements for deportation hearings set forth in the Japanese
Immigrant Case.
Moreover, courts interpret the requirements of due process
differently now than they did in 1903, when the Supreme
Court decided the Japanese Immigrant Case. For example,
courts now recognize a right-to-counsel requirement in depor-
tation hearings."7 Today's courts also require an impartial
decisionmakerl' s and the presence of a competent interpreter
in deportation hearings. 19 This gradual shift toward more pro-
113. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text (explaining the sum-
mary-exclusion procedure).
114. See supra note 73 (noting the importance of the alien's unexercised
right to appeal to the Coures determination of the Japanese Immigrant Case).
115. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (stating the fRIRA's pro-
hibition against judicial or administrative review of summary-exclusion de-
terminations and explaining its prohibitions against habeas corpus collateral
attacks).
116. A cursory check on screening officers' decisions is required by De-
partment of Justice regulations. See Aliens and Nationality, 62 FED. REG.
10,311, 10,357 (1997). These regulations provide that INS officers must record all
screening interviews and obtain sworn statements from aliens before removing
them. See id- at 10,355. A screening officer's supervisor must then review this
record and approve the removal order before summary exclusion takes place.
See id. at 10,357. This superficial review is an inadequate limitation on
screening officers' otherwise unqualified authority to decide immigration
claims. Supervisory officers usually will base their determinations solely on
what is contained in the record, and therefore, any supportive information
missing from the record will not be considered in this supervisory review.
117. See supra note 73 (citing precedent holding that due process requires
the right to obtain private counsel in deportation hearings).
118. See supra note 82 (citing precedent holding that due process requires
impartiality in deportation proceedings).
119. See supra note 73 (citing precedent holding that due process requires
an effective interpreter to assist at deportation hearings when the alien does
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tective due process requirements appears to reflect a greater
understanding of how specific procedures may encourage or ob-
struct fundamental fairness. 120 Until the enactment of the AEDPA
and the IRIRA, the INA codified many of these protections, guar-
anteeing the rights to counsel, notice, and an impartial decision by
someone other than the officer investigating or prosecuting the
case.121 Recent court decisions"n and the statutory codification
of these requirements demonstrate that the restrictive view of
due process set forth in the Japanese Immigrant Case has
since been expanded. The ITRIRA's summary-exclusion provi-
sions fail to provide deportable aliens the procedural guaran-
tees that modern courts hold constitutionally imperative.
The government could try to overcome unfavorable prece-
dents by arguing that the Court should overrule them. The
government might contend, for example, that aliens are a class
of persons undeserving of any constitutional protection because
it is citizenship that gives rise to an individual's rights and re-
sponsibilities under the Constitution. 123 This argument ignores
the plain text of the Constitution, however, which differentiates
between "citizens" and "persons" and specifically guarantees
due process rights to all "persons."124 Because the Constitution's
Framers carefully preserved this distinction, it follows that they
would have made the Due Process Clause applicable only to
not understand English).
120. See supra note 73 (relating the theory that a shift in general proce-
dural due process requirements occurred during the 1970s, resulting in an in-
crease in the procedure courts required at deportation hearings).
12L See supra note 90 and accompanying text (describing the statutory
right to counsel at deportation hearings under the INA); note 91 and accom-
panying text (describing the statutory right to notice of deportation hearings
under the INA); note 82 (describing the statutory right to an impartial deci-
sionmaker at deportation hearings under the INA).
122. See supra notes 73, 82 (citing precedents holding that due process re-
quires the right to obtain counsel, impartiality, and an effective interpreter in
deportation proceedings).
123. This argument analogizes government to a contractual relationship in
which citizens relinquish a part of their individual autonomy to the sovereign
in exchange for the benefits of living in an organized society, including consti-
tutional protections. It asserts that aliens are not parties to the "contract,"
and therefore, are not entitled to due process. This assertion fails to recognize
that the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights are not protections offered by
the government to its people, but rather restrictions on the government's
ability to violate the human rights that all people possess as a matter of natu-
ral law.
124. U.S. CONST., amends. V, XV; see also supra note 43 and accompany-
ing text (parsing the Due Process Clause of the Constitution).
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citizens had it been their intent to exclude noncitizens from its
protection.125
The government could also argue that the Japanese Immi-
grant Case is inconsistent with the plenary power of the politi-
cal branches to regulate immigration as a matter of national
foreign policy.126 It requires a significant leap of logic, however,
to conclude that the legislature's interest in foreign relations is
somehow injured by the Constitution's requirement of proce-
dural due process in deportation hearings. Procedural safe-
guards do not weaken legislative control over immigration, but
instead strengthen that control by ensuring that the executive
branch faithfully carries out the legislature's substantive
guidelines. These safeguards also do not improperly shift ex-
ecutive power to the judiciary, because the executive conducts
the review process through immigration judges within the Ex-
ecutive Office for Immigration Review.127 The procedural due
process requirements set forth in the Japanese Immigrant Case,
therefore, do not conflict with the plenary power of the political
branches to determine the grounds for admission or expulsion of
aliens. The government's interest in protecting that power is,
consequently, an inappropriate basis for overruling the Japa-
nese Immigrant Case.
If faced with a procedural due process challenge, the Court
could not uphold the summary-exclusion provisions of the
TIRIRA without overturning the Japanese Immigrant Case,
and it could not reasonably overturn that precedent. It must,
therefore, hold that aliens in deportation are entitled to proce-
dural due process and strike down those sections of the summary-
125. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (stating
that the Constitution affords due process not only to "citizens" but to all
"persons" within United States territory).
126. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text (explaining the Court's ra-
tionale in upholding the federal governments plenary power over immigration).
The Constitution allocates control over such matters to the Legislature and
the Executive. See supra note 61 (noting the origins of legislative and execu-
tive power over immigration). In upholding these branches' unlimited power
to exclude arriving aliens, the Court argues that the United States, as a sovereign
nation, must have virtually unlimited power to restrict the entry of foreigners
if it is to maintain its independence and resist the controlling influences of
foreign nations. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text (enumerating
the Court's arguments that immigration authority is grounded in the foreign
relations power). The government might argue that its important interest in
withstanding the influence of foreign nations is even more compelling when
the citizens of those nations are already residing illegally on American soil.
127. See supra note 86 (explaining the role of the Executive Office for Im-
migration Review within the branches of government).
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exclusion provisions affecting aliens found inside the nation's bor-
ders.
B. THE IIRIRA CONFLICTS WITH THE COURT'S PROCEDURAL
DUE PROCESS ANALYSIS
The IIRIRA fails the Supreme Court's standard procedural
due process balancing test, which requires courts to weigh the
government's interest against the threat to the interests of in-
dividuals and the risk of error in the decisionmaking process.
2 1
Although procedural due process applies only if there are pre-
liminary factual issues in dispute, the IRIRA system creates
enough potential grounds for factual disagreements that pro-
cedural rights should be triggered.
2 9
1. The Government's Interest in Avoiding Immigration
Hearings
Immigration law before the passage of the IIRIRA required
the government to conduct hearings in both deportation and
exclusion cases. 130 The INS has provided such hearings for
years, which suggests that the burden of conducting hearings
in all deportation cases is not too great for the government to
manage effectively. Nevertheless, deportation hearings are
expensive to conduct,"' and the government has a legitimate
interest in minimizing costs. Summary exclusion disposes of
immigration cases very quickly, potentially reducing the costs
associated with case administration and the time aliens spend
in detention. Any potential cost reduction is speculative, how-
ever, because no empirical data demonstrates that summary-
exclusion procedures actually reduce costs. 132  Advocates of
128. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (describing the Mathews
due process balancing test); see also supra note 48 (noting that the Supreme
Court applies the Mathews balancing test in the immigration context).
129. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (noting the factual dispute
requirement).
130. See supra text accompanying notes 86-87 (describing the INA's re-
quirement that a hearing take place in both deportation and exclusion pro-
ceedings).
131. See supra note 40 (reporting the dollar amount allocated to the EOIR
in 1997); see also Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (describing the
government's interest in reducing the administrative costs of immigration as
"weighty").
132. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (noting the IIRIRA's
requirement that the GAO complete a report assessing whether summary ex-
clusion results in a reduction in administrative costs).
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summary exclusion might further argue that nonadministra-
tive costs associated with aliens, such as increased crime and
unemployment rates, justify deporting them as quickly as pos-
sible. That aliens actually increase these costs, however, is un-
supported by empirical evidence. 133 Even if future research finds
that the new procedures reduce administrative and other costs,
that reduction cannot justify eviscerating procedural protections
that both the courts and prior immigration statutes have man-
dated for years.134 As argued below, the alien's interests, and
the risk of error in deportation hearings, significantly outweigh
the government's interest in cost reduction.135
2. The Immigrant's Interest in Receiving a Hearing
In contrast with any arguable government interest, the
individual alien's interest in the procedural protections man-
dated by the old immigration statute is enormous. The de-
ported alien may lose her home, her job, and her relationships
with friends and family in the United States.136 Deportation
also jeopardizes physical liberty during the period of incar-
ceration that frequently precedes removal, and during the re-
moval process itself.'37  These costs are even greater for an
alien who came to the United States to seek asylum, because
she risks torture or even death upon return to her home coun-
try. The alien's interests in family, freedom, safety, and life it-
self are extremely important and thus strongly counter the
government's interest in reducing costs. 38
133. See supra notes 31-33 (arguing that public perceptions about the
negative impact of aliens on crime, unemployment, and welfare programs are
unsubstantiated).
134. See supra note 69 and accompanying text (describing the Court's
holding in the Japanese Immigrant Case); supra text accompanying note 86
(citing Court precedent and INA provisions requiring a hearing in deportation
proceedings).
135. See infra Parts II.B.2-3 (discussing the alien's interest and the high
risk of error in deportation hearings).
136. See supra note 15 and accompanying text (enumerating these inter-
ests as some of the reasons why aliens come to the United States).
137. Physical lfberty is one of the most significant interests the Due Process
Clause protects. See supra note 46 (explaining the importance of physical liberty
interests under the procedural due process guarantee).
138. Cf. Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (describing the claim-
ant's interests in living and working in the United States and rejoining with
her family as "weighty").
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3. The Risk of Error in the Decisionmaking Process
The risk of error in the summary-exclusion process is also
enormous. Because of language barriers, aliens are much more
likely than natural-born citizens to fail to communicate their
claims to a decisionmaker accurately and independently.139
Procedural protections, including the rights to written notice
and access to counsel, significantly decrease the risk of mis-
communication. 140  Furthermore, summary exclusion intro-
duces a high risk of bias in the decisionmaking process because
it requires the same immigration official to both investigate
and decide an individual claim. Even the most rational and
circumspect immigration officer may be unable to execute these
roles simultaneously without prejudice to the claimant. 41
The assumption that all inspection officers are impartial is
also questionable. Aliens have reported numerous cases of
violent physical abuse by immigration officials." While these
reports reflect the actions of a small number of officers, they
suggest a high probability of anti-immigrant bias among some
immigration officers. The broad discretion INS officials have
during summary exclusion and the absence of any appeals
process allow those officers who are biased to misreport facts
and make erroneous decisions repeatedly without detection.
143
Because the risk of error in immigration proceedings is so
high, and the alien's interest in a hearing so significant, the
government's interest in reducing administrative costs fails to
outweigh them. Summary exclusion therefore fails the Su-
preme Court's procedural due process balancing test. An im-
partial hearing should be required when an alien alleges facts
139. Tmmigrants frequently do not speak English and are even less likely
than citizens to understand the intricacies of the American legal system.
These handicaps introduce great risk that an individual will neither under-
stand the charges against him nor be able to convey facts that are essential to
the decisionmaking process.
140. Notice is necessary for an alien to have the time to obtain counsel or
assistance from nonlawyer volunteers. The right to counsel may be essential
not only as a matter of advocacy in the immigration court, but also as a mat-
ter of educating aliens about their legal rights.
141. See supra note 82 (describing how the adoption of dual roles by an
immigration officer threatens the fairness and impartiality of a deportation
hearing).
142. See supra note 25 (citing reports of assaults against aliens committed
by immigration officials and border patrol agents).
143. See supra note 116 (discussing the limited role supervisors play in de-
tecting the mistakes and biases of the screening officers). o
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sufficient to state a claim for admission under substantive
immigration law.
4. The Possibility of Factual Disputes Under the Substantive
Law of the URIRA
Because the ITRIRA creates very few substantive rights,
the possible grounds for factual dispute in an immigration
hearing are limited. Several grounds for dispute do exist, how-
ever, and all aliens should thus have access to a full and fair
hearing in order to address those issues when they arise.1"
For example, an alien might dispute the factual basis of a
screening officer's determination that she is "inadmissible."145
A screening officer might erroneously decide that an alien is
inadmissible by incorrectly finding that a valid visa is fraudu-
lent1" or that a battered woman was never abused.147 Such
mistakes would infiinge on both the substantive and the pro-
cedural rights of an affected alien because a screening officer's
determination of admissibility serves both as a substantive
144. Threshold determinations about an individual's immigration status
are of foremost importance. The procedural process must ensure that indi-
viduals who claim to be here legally have an opportunity to present evidence
supporting their claims. Otherwise summary exclusion could result in the
arbitrary deportation of legal permanent residents, asylees, refugee, or even
citizens. Fortunately, the IRIRA guards against this possibility. It provides
that any alleged alien may obtain a hearing if that individual claims, in the
face of possible criminal penalty, to be a legal permanent resident, refugee, or
asylee. See supra text accompanying note 106 (describing the IIRIRA's ad-
ministrative review provision for aliens claiming to have legal immigration
status).
145. The IIRIRA classifies immigrants who entered the country without
inspection or valid documents as inadmissible and automatically subject to
removal See supra note 95 (setting forth the IIRIRA's definitions of
"admission" and "inadmissible"). Although an alleged alien in custody may
bring a habeas corpus claim on the grounds that she is not an alien, unless
she is a legal permanent resident, refugee, or asylee, she may not challenge a
screening officer's determination on the threshold question of her admissibil-
ity. See supra note 107 (noting the IIRIRA's habeas corpus provisions).
146. The statute considers aliens with current visas and those with expired
visas to be already admitted. See supra note 95 (setting forth the IR 's
definitions of "admission" and "inadmissible").
147. The statute deems battered women, abused children, and the non-
battering parents of abused children to be admissible if they can demonstrate
a connection between the abuse and their illegal entry into the United States.
See supra note 105 (describing the HRIRA's special exceptions for battered
women and children).
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basis for the officer's decision to remove the alien and as
grounds for applying the summary-exclusion procedure. 148
Screening officers decide other issues that directly affect
only procedural rights. For example, a screening officer might
erroneously deny access to a hearing by incorrectly concluding
that an alien entered a year ago, when, in fact, the individual
entered two years ago without inspection. 149 The injury caused
when an inspection officer erroneously excludes a person with-
out a hearing is not just academic. The HRIRA permits both
legal and illegal aliens to apply for various forms of discretion-
ary relief, but an alien cannot qualify for some of these forms of
relief without a hearing. For example, the IIRIRA permits an
alien to request voluntary departure either in lieu of a removal
hearing or after a removal hearing, but not in lieu of summary
exclusion. 150 Voluntary departure is therefore contingent on
the right to a removal hearing. Similarly, a battered woman
whose abuser is a U.S. citizen may request adjustment of
status to that of a legal, permanent resident if she has resided
in the United States for at least three years.' 5' This form of
relief would be unavailable to her if a screening officer errone-
ously subjected her to summary exclusion.
In a variety of circumstances aliens might dispute whether
a screening officer has accurately applied the law during the
screening process to their factual circumstances. Because fac-
tual disputes will inevitably arise, the screening process must
guarantee an avenue for the fair and impartial resolution of
those disputes. The summary-exclusion procedures of the
IIRIRA cut off all such avenues and thereby deny aliens who
are present in the United States the procedural protections
promised to them in the Japanese Immigrant Case.
148. See supra notes 95, 97 (defining admissibility and explaining the ef-
fect of an INS officer's determination that an alien is inadmissible). Summary
exclusion is therefore dangerously circular: it is because the alien was found
inadmissible that she is deprived of a hearing on the issue of her admissibil-
ity.
149. Aliens who entered illegally are not subject to summary exclusion if
they have resided continuously in the United States for more than two years.
See supra text accompanying note 96 (describing the ITRIRA's two year resi-
dence provision).
150. See supra note 92 (describing the IIRIRA's voluntary departure pro-
visions).
15t See supra note 105 (discussing the IIRA's special provisions for bat-
tered women and children).
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C. TEE IIRIRA DOES NOT REFLECT A COHERENT LEGAL
THEORY
In addition to contradicting immigration law precedent
and procedural due process jurisprudence, the IIRIRA is also
theoretically incoherent. It applies summary exclusion to un-
documented excludable aliens and deportable aliens with less
than two years' residence in the United States who entered il-
legally.'52 The TIRIRA, therefore, makes length of residence
and legality of entry determinative of whether an individual is
entitled to an administrative hearing. These criteria reflect a
moral judgment that the United States should not reward ille-
gally entering aliens with a hearing, unless they have lived
here long enough to develop the close ties associated with long-
term residence.153 The IIRIRA thus balances the government's
interest in deterring illegal entry against the long-term illegal
alien's strong interests in admission.
The supposition that long-term residence necessarily cor-
relates with the strength of an alien's legitimate ties to the
United States is ill-founded. A short-term resident illegal en-
trant with close family members in the United States may
have a stronger and more legitimate interest in admission than
a long-term resident with no family. Because many aliens
come to the United States to reunite with resident family
members, length of residence is not sufficiently calibrated to
the strength of an alien's interest to serve as a proxy for close
ties to the United States. The criterion of long-term residence
is thus both over- and under-inclusive because it inquires into
an alien's length of stay rather than more probative factors,
like actual family ties. In addition, the Japanese Immigrant
Case contradicts any suggestion that due process applies only
to long-term residents-the Court mandated due process in
that case for an alien who had been in the United States for
only four days. 154 In sum, the length of an alien's stay in the
152. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text (generally defining
summary exclusion under the IIRIRA). This discussion leaves aside special
exceptions for battered women, asylees, and aliens arriving by aircraft from
western states with whom the United States does not have full diplomatic
relations.
153. This analysis mirrors the Supreme Court's "close ties" rationale for
upholding the entry doctrine. See supra note 55 and accompanying text
(explaining the "close ties" rationale). For arguments against the "close ties"
rationale as it applies to the entry doctrine, see infra Part HLA.
154. See supra text accompanying note 70 (describing the facts of the
Japanese Immigrant Case).
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United States is not a valid criterion for determining whether that
individual deserves a full and fair hearing on the issue of deport-
ability.
The government's interest in deterring illegal immigration
is also an illegitimate basis for assigning due process rights to
aliens. Superficially this criterion appears rational. By attach-
ing the right to a hearing to a claimant's legal status, the
IIRIRA eliminates the most controversial element of the entry
doctrine1 5-- that aliens who enter illegally receive better proc-
ess than those who present themselves at the border in compli-
ance with the law. Now neither group receives a removal
hearing. 56 In reality, however, the IIRIRA is as arbitrary as
the entry doctrine because it imposes summary exclusion on
aliens who entered illegally but not on aliens who obtained il-
legal residence by overstaying a visa.157 Both groups of aliens
maintain their residence in the United States in defiance of
immigration laws and neither group has a recognizably greater
interest in admittance than the other. If obedience to the law
is a valid prerequisite to obtaining due process, then no illegal
alien should have the right to a hearing.
Obedience to the law, however, should not be a prerequi-
site to obtaining due process when the substantive issue to be
decided by the process is whether a claimant actually broke the
law. One could not rationally uphold a criminal justice system
in which only innocent people have a right to a trial while
guilty people must go immediately to jail. Yet, this is precisely
the effect that the summary-exclusion provisions have on the
immigration process.1 58 The Constitution does not allocate pro-
cedural due process to people on the basis of good behavior; it
is not a reward but a neutral means of assuring that the gov-
ernment distributes rewards and punishments according to
law. The integrity of the system depends on the application of
fair process to all individuals. Legal status is therefore not a
155. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (relating commentators'
criticisms of the entry doctrine).
156. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text (defining generally
summary exclusion under the IIRIRA).
157. See supra note 95 (explaining the IRIRA's distinction between illegal
entrants and other aliens with illegal immigration status).
158. Summary exclusion requires the INS to remove inadmissible ("guilty")
aliens immediately, while admissible ("innocent") aliens are entitled to a
hearing on the issue of their right to enter or remain in the country. See su-
pra note 95 (setting forth the IRIRA's definitions of "admission" and
"inadmissible").
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valid criterion for defining the scope of due process in the con-
text of immigration.
The terms of the ITRIRA are not developed out of a com-
prehensive legal theory but appear to spring from Congress's
desire to address the inconsistencies inherent in the entry doc-
trine without risking the political backlash likely to result from
expanding aliens' procedural rights.159 These terms conflict
with both Supreme Court precedent governing immigration
law and with the Court's procedural due process analysis in
other contexts. Revision of the law set forth in the IIRIRA is
therefore imperative.
III. CREATING CONSTITUTIONAL IMMIGRATION
REFORM
Although Congress and the Executive have almost com-
plete authority to regulate substantive immigration law free of
restraint,160 the Supreme Court has, with the entry doctrine,
carved out a narrow sphere of constitutional rights for deport-
able aliens that Congress cannot permissibly transgress.
161
The restriction of these rights to this class of individuals is ar-
bitrary and inconsistent with the Court's procedural due proc-
ess analysis in other legal contexts. In other contexts the
Court has focused on the significance of the individual interest
threatened rather than on the classification of the individual.162
To harmonize its holdings the Court must cease to recognize a
category of persons who are excluded from due process protection
and instead concentrate on the nature of the protected interest.
Congress has indicated its disapproval of the entry doctrine by
legislatively eliminating it through the IIRIR.1 63 Instead of ex-
panding the group of aliens entitled to due process, however,
this statute narrows the sphere of protected individuals even
further. As a result, Congress succeeded not only in drawing
another arbitrary distinction but also in directly encroaching
159. The HRIRA developed in response to a strong anti-immigrant senti-
ment growing in American society. See supra Part IA (discussing the political
climate in which the JIRIRA developed).
160. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text (explaining the author-
ity of the legislative and executive branches to regulate immigration).
16L See supra Part .C (defining the entry doctrine and discussing its im-
pact on aliens' rights).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46 (discussing generally the
Court's definition of the interests that procedural due process protects).
163. See supra Part ID (explaining how the JIRIRA eliminates the entry
doctrine).
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upon the rights of those individuals whom the Court deems
constitutionally protected.
A. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD RENOUNCE THE ENTRY
DOCTRINE
Congress's unwillingness to respect the entry doctrine will
make it necessary for the Supreme Court to take inventory of
its decisions and to consider whether the doctrine deserves
preservation in the face of clear legislative disapproval." In
granting a hearing to aliens who enter illegally while denying
process to those who faithfully present themselves for inspec-
tion at the border, the entry doctrine seems patently unfair. 6
Courts and commentators have offered several justifications for
this anomaly, but none withstands rigorous analysis. For ex-
ample, the Supreme Court has argued that aliens in deportation
develop close ties through continued residence that aliens in ex-
clusion do not share. 66 This argument does not withstand close
scrutiny, because an alien on the threshold of entry may also
have strong familial, economic, or property interests waiting
for her in the United States. 167 The Court does not explain why
it rejects the new arrival's right to protect those interests but
strains to defend them when the claimant is an illegal alien
resident. An alien who comes to this country to be reunited
with his children surely has a greater interest in admittance
on the threshold of entry than does a resident of many years
who remains in the United States only to benefit from its high
standard of living. The "ties" that come with residence are
thus insufficient to justify the entry doctrine.
Another argument in support of the entry doctrine asserts
that the Constitution's authority extends only to our national
boundaries, 168 and, therefore, individuals seeking admission
lack the protections of the Due Process Clause. This argument
implies that deportable aliens are entitled to due process solely
164. See supra Part I.D.
165. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (relating commentator's
criticisms of the entry doctrine).
166. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (citing Supreme Court
precedent for the "close ties" rationale). For an argument that the "close ties"
rationale is also an inappropriate basis for the length of residence require-
ment of the IIRIRA, see supra Part 1.C.
167. See supra note 54 (describing arguments against the entry doctrine).
168. See supra note 55 (setting forth a territorial rationale for the entry
doctrine).
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because they are inside national boundaries. This rationale is
fundamentally flawed, however, because the entry doctrine
denies procedural due process to aliens who are actually within
U.S. territory. This result is achieved through a basic tenet of
the entry doctrine that when INS officials stop an alien at the
border and then forcibly detain her inside, she is as unpro-
tected by the Constitution as if she had never crossed the
boundary line.169 The Constitution, therefore, does not reach
her even though she is within its territorial scope. Conse-
quently, the entry doctrine itself conflicts with the theory that
territorial boundaries determine the scope of Constitutional
protection.
An additional justification for the entry doctrine argues
that presence within United States borders is the precondition
that triggers procedural due process. This theory conceptual-
izes presence itself as the liberty or property interest an alien
seeks. Illegal aliens inside the nation's borders already have a
possessory interest in this benefit; aliens on the verge of entry
do not.170 The alien seeking entry requests a privilege, while
the resident alien seeks to protect a possessory right. This
view relies on a distinction between rights and privileges that
the Court has abandoned in every context except immigration
law. 7' The Court offers no reason for continuing to apply this
outdated construct to immigration law and should cease to rec-
ognize it altogether.
All of these justifications for upholding the entry doctrine
appear to be the post-hoc speculations of courts and commenta-
tors trying to rationalize how immigration law developed. The
Court's distinction between deportation and exclusion proceedings
began with Knauff v. Shaughnessy'72 and its incorrect interpre-
tation of Nishimura Ekiu v. United States73 and the Japanese
169. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text (explaining the legal
construction by which an excludable alien detained inside the border is
deemed to be outside the border).
170. Some courts have suggested that when a property interest is at stake,
a claimant must already enjoy its benefits to successfully challenge its denial
without due process. See supra note 46 (discussing the procedural due proc-
ess "present enjoymentr requirement). The entry doctrine may reflect such a
requirement, as aliens inside the United States' borders already receive the
benefits of presence here, while incoming aliens do not. This "present enjoy-
men?' requirement, however, is not a firmly established doctrine. See id.
17 See supra note 77 (discussing the rights/privileges distinction and its
application to immigration law).
172. 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
173. 142 U.S. 651 (1891).
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Immigrant Case. 74 The Knauff Court misread the Nishimura
Ekiu precedent as explained in the Japanese Immigrant Case,
denied that due process applies to exclusion, and thereby ex-
panded the power of the political branches to regulate immi-
gration beyond the limits of the Constitution. 175  Neither
Nishimura Ekiu nor the Japanese Immigrant Case explains
why deportation and exclusion should be treated differently.
The entry doctrine assumes that the Supreme Court inten-
tionally distinguished deportation and exclusion from each
other. A plain reading of the Japanese Immigrant Case demon-
strates that this assumption is unsound. 176  It affirms
Nishimura Ekiu's holding that a government officer's order
concerning an immigrant's right to "enter" or "remain" in the
country constitutes due process of law.7 The Japanese Immi-
grant Case immediately qualifies that statement, however,
with the proviso that an officer may not disregard due process
principles when executing a statute that affects the "liberty of
persons."'78 A plain interpretation of the text is that this pro-
viso qualifies the entire statement that preceded it. The Japa-
nese Immigrant Case assumes that removal affects the liberty
of persons and thus holds that the Due Process Clause limits
government authority to regulate both deportation and exclusion.
The entry doctrine, therefore, has no rational basis, but is the
result of the Knauff Court's misreading of established prece-
dent. It is high time for the Court to renounce it. 79
B. THE NEED FOR LEGITIMATE REFORM
The entry doctrine's fundamental weakness is that it de-
veloped without the benefit of a coherent legal theory. The
Court should renounce the entry doctrine and replace it with a
strong legal theory defining how procedural due process should
apply to immigration proceedings. This new theory may then
serve as the basis for constitutionally permissible statutory re-
form.
174. 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
175. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 71.
177. See supra note 71.
178. See supra note 71.
179. Because the entry doctrine is no longer codified in any statute, the
Court will not face any direct challenges to its validity. The Court could indi-
rectly reject the doctrine, however, by treating deportable and excludable ali-
ens' challenges to summary exclusion similarly.
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1. The Development of a New Legal Theory
To survive judicial scrutiny, immigration legal theory must
be in harmony with the Court's procedural due process analy-
sis outside the immigration context. Procedural rights should
not depend on a person's nationality, geographic location, length of
residence, legal status, or any other demographic classification.
Rather, immigration due process analysis must focus, as the
Court's general procedural due process analysis focuses, on the
individual interest government action threatens to under-
mine. 180
Accurate identification of the interests immigration orders
threaten is extremely important. Removal orders may deprive
aliens of an infinite number of specific interests, including
freedom from persecution, job opportunities, families, homes,
social contacts, and education. The importance of these inter-
ests varies in each individual case. Congress would face an
impossible task if it attempted to write a uniform law that
could separately calibrate all of these interests and balance
them against the government's interest in minimizing the costs
of administrative procedures. Deprivation of these interests is
an indirect, secondary effect of the immigration removal process.
While these secondary interests are important, the possibility that
government action might threaten them is not a solid basis for
constructing a uniform law. Unfortunately, the Court's appli-
cation of procedural due process principles to immigration pro-
ceedings has focused entirely on these variable, secondary
deprivations rather than on those deprivations that are the di-
rect, proximate result of government action.18' An alien's loss of
physical liberty in the removal process is such a direct depri-
vation. Procedural due process arguably protects all aliens'
liberty interests when the government takes them into custody
and forcibly transports them back to their countries of origin.182
These deprivations affect excludable aliens and deportable ali-
180. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46 (discussing generally the
Coures definition of the interests that procedural due process protects).
181. For example, the Coures "close ties" rationale is based entirely on
consideration of secondary interests.
182. If the INS responded to unwanted arriving aliens by simply stopping
them at the border and refusing entry, the deprivation of liberty would be
much less clear. Once an alien is detained, however, the INS only allows him
to withdraw his application for admission and return home not as a matter of
right but at the discretion of the INS. See Aliens and Nationality, 62 FsD.
REG. 10,311, 10,358 (1997) (stating the current regulation on withdrawal of
applications).
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ens with equal force, and therefore, no basis exists for distin-
guishing between them. Because physical liberty is one of the
most significant interests protected by the Due Process
Clause, i"3 it weighs heavily against the government's interest
in reducing administrative costs. Given the vehemently anti-
immigrant political climate84 and an entrenched legal tradi-
tion of overlooking the liberty restrictions on detained aliens,
8 5
however, the Supreme Court is currently unlikely to recognize
that excludable aliens have a constitutional right to due process.
Hopefully, the Court will one day look beyond politics and tra-
dition and hold that incarcerating any human being without a
hearing is constitutionally impermissible.
2. Statutory Reform
The pre-reform INA protected excludable aliens' liberty in-
terests by granting them the right to a hearing, in spite of the
Supreme Court's failure to recognize a constitutional basis for
that right.18 6 The IIRIRA took that protection away not only
from excludable aliens, but also from some deportable aliens
whose constitutional right to an administrative hearing was
recognized almost a century ago. 187 The revised law will con-
tinue to undermine the Constitution until Congress wholly re-
peals the IIRIRA's summary-exclusion provisions. Congress
should then reinstate the INA's pre-reform removal process
provisions with one major modification-deportation and ex-
clusion proceedings should be combined, as the TIRIRA sug-
gests, into a single removal proceeding.88 This change would
183. See supra note 46 (explaining the importance of physical liberty inter-
ests for procedural due process analysis).
184. See supra Part L.A (describing the public animus towards legal and
illegal aliens precipitating the enactment of the AEDPA and the IIRIRA).
185. The Supreme Court's failure to acknowledge the liberty interests of
aliens led to an unconscionable result in Mezei, where the Court held that the
government could keep an alien in prison indefinitely when no other nation
would admit him. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text (detailing the
facts of Mezei).
186. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text (enumerating the
IIRA's exclusion and deportation procedure provisions).
187. See supra text accompanying note 100 (explaining that summary ex-
clusion applies to deportable aliens who entered without inspection and re-
sided in the United States for two years or less); supra text accompanying
note 69 (stating the Japanese Immigrant Case holding that due process guar-
antees deportable aliens the right to a hearing).
188. The combination of deportation and exclusion processes into a single
proceeding would require Congress to decide whether to preserve or eliminate
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eliminate the arbitrary distinction imposed by the entry doc-
trine. In contrast with the IRIRA, however, this proceeding
must grant an impartial hearing, as the pre-reform INA did, to
all applicants regardless of their status as incoming aliens or
prior arrivals.
Granting hearings to excludable aliens will not by itself in-
crease administrative costs because such hearings were mandatory
under pre-reform law.189 The overall cost of immigration admini-
stration may nonetheless significantly increase. The IRIRAl's
new draconian restrictions and strong enforcement mecha-
nisms might precipitate a mass exodus of unwanted aliens
from the country.1 90 Because of these new restrictions, the Ex-
ecutive Office For Immigration Review (EOIR)191 may soon
witness a substantial influx of removal orders requiring re-
view. The efficient but unconstitutional summary-exclusion
provisions could potentially offset the flood of cases that oth-
erwise might overrun the EOIR's capacity.192
Nonetheless, summary exclusion is not the only possible
means of resolving this problem. Congress should substitute
constitutionally permissible docket control methods in its
place. For example, the INS could slow the processing of cases
involving aliens who are self-supporting, non-threatening to
the public, and cooperative with immigration authorities. 193
those protections formerly granted only in deportation proceedings. Congress
should consider government costs and judicial precedents in making such de-
cisions. For example, deportable aliens' right to retain counsel is constitu-
tionally protected. See supra note 72-73 (defining current notions of what
protections due process requires in deportation proceedings). Guaranteeing
excludable aliens the right to retain counsel would minimally increase government
costs as long as exercising that right did not delay the removal process. The com-
bined removal proceeding, therefore, should preserve the right to retain counsel for
both classes of aliens within given time limits.
189. See supra note 87 and accompanying text (citing the pre-reform INA
provision granting hearings to excludable aliens).
190. See supra notes 3, 6 (stating that the new law requires the INS to de-
port even long-term legal permanent residents with convictions for very minor
crimes, and noting that it substantially increases border patrol and enforce-
ment).
19L See supra note 86 (defining the roles of the EOIR and the INS in the
immigration system).
192. Congress alluded to this concern when it ordered the GAO to perform
a cost-benefit analysis of the JIRIRA's summary-exclusion procedures. See
supra note 41 (detailing the IIRIRA provisions mandating this study).
193. The class of aliens who meet these requirements may be quite large
under the new law, because the ERIRA requires the INS to deport legal per-
manent residents with long past convictions for many non-violent crimes. See
supra note 3 (describing the grounds for deportation under the new law).
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The government's interest in removing such aliens is not urgent,
and placing them on a protracted hearing schedule would do little
public harm.
Emergency situations may require Congress to apply more
restrictive measures. In such situations Congress should con-
sider implementing summary-hearing processes that are more
protective of aliens' rights than the summary-exclusion provi-
sions of the IRIRA. The most troubling aspect of the JRIRA's
summary-exclusion provisions is that they place the entire de-
cisionmaking process under the control of INS officials. Sepa-
rating the investigative and prosecutorial roles of the INS and
the judicial role of the EOIR is an essential safeguard against
bias and miscommunication. 94  Screening interviews con-
ducted by the EOIR would thus raise fewer concerns. The gov-
ernment could further alleviate the possibility of bias by re-
quiring EOIR screening officials to ask standardized questions
designed to ascertain whether claimants allege facts upon
which an application to remain in the United States could be
granted. 95 Aliens who allege facts to support any colorable
claim would automatically receive an adversarial hearing be-
fore an immigration judge. The INS could immediately remove
all others without infringing on their due process rights.196
These docket control methods would make the EOIR's sys-
tem of processing cases more efficient. In addition, Congress
should also consider long-term solutions aimed at reducing the
EOIR's overall caseload. The I]RIRA prescribes new increases
in border patrol and enforcement, which will discourage illegal
entry and prevent many aliens from entering the administra-
tive process in the first place. 97 Hopefully, these provisions
Some of these aliens have stable jobs, families, and homes in the United
States. They would present little threat to the public and low risk of flight,
enabling the INS to release them on bail rather than tax INS detention facil-
ity capacities.
194. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (setting forth precedent to
support the conclusion that adoption of dual roles by an immigration officer
threatens the fairness and impartiality of immigration hearings).
195. EOIR screening officials should ask, for example, whether aliens un-
der their review have a history of persecution, allege possession of valid im-
migration documents, or claim to have a spouse or children living legally in
the United States.
196. Procedural due process is satisfied without a formal hearing when a
claimant presents no factual issues to resolve. See supra note 49 and accom-
panying text (stating that due process requires no formal procedure when
there are no factual issues to resolve).
197. See supra note 6 (discussing the IRIRA's provisions for increased
border patrol).
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will offset some of the anticipated increases in immigration
cases. Removing job opportunities and other incentives to
immigrate to the United States should also decrease the num-
ber of people seeking admission. Critics of the JIRIRA argue
that it fails to set forth sufficient penalties against employers
who hire illegal aliens.198 In time, enhancing these penalties
would decrease the number of aliens entering the United
States and result in a long-term reduction in immigration
cases and administrative costs.
Congress' desire to minimize the impact of the IIRA's
new substantive restrictions on the administrative system is
understandable. By prescribing summary exclusion, however,
Congress blindly answered this problem without considering
constitutionality or fairness. In doing so, Congress overlooked
reasonable alternatives that would allow the government to
avoid increased administrative costs without abrogating the
procedural rights of people who, if given the opportunity to
speak, could demonstrate a compelling reason under substan-
tive immigration law for the government to allow them to live
in the United States.
CONCLUSION
The IIRIRA is an unconstitutional invasion of aliens' pro-
cedural due process rights. Longstanding Supreme Court
precedent holds that the government may not deport people
without giving them hearings, regardless of whether they en-
tered legally or illegally, and regardless of how long they have
lived here. The IIRIRA violates that precedent by permitting
the INS to deport some classes of aliens without granting them
either a hearing or an appeal. The brief interview which these
aliens receive under the IRIRA's summary-exclusion provi-
sions is insufficient to meet the procedural standards that
modern courts have held necessary in deportation hearings.
The IIRIRA also fails the standard balancing test which the
Court uses to adjudicate procedural due process challenges
outside the context of immigration law. The government's in-
terest in summary exclusion's cost-saving possibilities is out-
weighed by the alien's compelling interests in avoiding depor-
tation and the significant risks of error associated with
immigration proceedings. Moreover, the IIRIRA reflects no co-
198. See supra note 29 (citing Senator Kennedy's recent criticism of the
IRIRA on these grounds).
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herent legal theory and thus has no rational basis for under-
mining the procedural rights of particular classes of aliens.
While federal case law is more protective of aliens' rights than
the IIRIRA, it, too, fails to adequately safeguard their interests.
For decades the Supreme Court has held that aliens entering the
United States for the first time have no procedural due process
rights, even if the INS detains them indefinitely. The Court's
decision to deny due process to these aliens, but grant it to
those found inside the border is arbitrary and unjustifiable.
The INS frequently incarcerates aliens during the immigration
process and, in doing so, takes away their physical freedom by
forcing them to leave the country. The Court should recognize
that procedural due process must attach whenever such impor-
tant liberty interests are threatened, and therefore, it should
apply to all aliens whom the INS intends to incarcerate or relo-
cate regardless of where they are when the INS finds them. A
revision of the IIRIRA based upon this comprehensive theory
would require the government to provide hearings to deportable
and excludable aliens who contest the government's factual
grounds for removing them. Such a provision would place a
premium on the protection of the rights of aliens without un-
duly compromising administrative efficiency.
The IIRIRA is the most comprehensive reform in U.S.
immigration law since its inception in the late 1800s. A grow-
ing belief among many Americans that aliens are responsible
for terrorism, unemployment, high crime rates, and welfare
abuse has put an enormous amount of political pressure on
legislators to strictly limit legal and illegal immigration. Con-
gress has responded to this pressure aggressively, undermin-
ing the constitutional rights of many vulnerable people to de-
fend their homes, jobs, families, lives, and liberty. The United
States may be sorely in need of immigration reform, but with
this piece of legislation Congress has gone too far.
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